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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (9) Autor Mauleon, Ana (2) Vannetelbosch, Vincent (2) Abdula, Arby (1) Caulier, Jean-Francois (1) Currier, Russell W. (1) Danforth, Diana M. (1) Goeringer, L. Paul (1) Golub, Benjamin (1) Grandjean, Gilles (1) Jackson, Matthew O. (1) Kennedy, Gary A. (1) Knutson, Ronald D. (1) Newton, Doris J. (1) Nwoha, Ogbonnaya John (1) Oleinik, Anton (1) Page, Frank H. (1) Patacchini, Eleonora (1) Pittman, Dianne (1) Popp, Jennie S. Hughes (1) Rea, Kenneth (1) Mais... Palavra-chave A14 (9) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (6) A13 (2) C70 (2) D85 (2) K42 (2) Social Networks (2) Z13 (2) A11 (1) A12 (1) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Allocation Rules (1) Authority (1) B15 (1) B25 (1) B52 (1) Basins of Attraction (1) Behavioral economics (1) Bounded Rationality (1) Bounded rationality (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (6) Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Journal Article (1) Ano 2010 (2) 2009 (4) 2007 (1) 2005 (2) País United States (9) Idioma Inglês (9)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 9 Primeira ... 1 ... Última ASYMMETRY IN RAW MILK SAFETY PERCEPTIONS AND INFORMATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK IN FRESH PRODUCE MARKETING AND POLICY AgEcon Knutson, Ronald D.; Currier, Russell W.; Ribera, Luis A.; Goeringer, L. Paul. Scientific evidence clearly indicates that consumption of raw milk carries substantial disease-inducing health risks. While federal U.S. policy mandates that milk moving in interstate commerce be pasteurized; within 41 of 50 states, raw milk can be obtained for consumption. Warning labels notwithstanding, a segment of U.S. consumers pays higher prices for higher-risk raw milk than for either organic or conventional milk. The behavioral factors leading to raw milk consumption are explored. The paternalistic regulatory options for reducing the risk associated with drinking raw milk are identified. Implications for fresh produce sold directly from farms to consumers or through farmers markets are drawn. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Raw milk; Pasteurization; Health risks; Behavioral economics; Bounded rationality; Paternalistic regulations; Public health; HACCP; GLOBALG.A.P.; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; A12; A13; A14; D11; D18; D46; D71; D78; D82; I18; K23; K32; Q11; Q18. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116440 Connections Among Farsighted Agents AgEcon Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Farsighted Players; Stability; Efficiency; Connections Model; Buyerseller Networks; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C70; D20. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50482 Contractually Stable Networks AgEcon Caulier, Jean-Francois; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Networks; Coalition Structures; Contractual Stability; Allocation Rules; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C70. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52343 Endogenous Network Dynamics AgEcon Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna H.. In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Endogenous Network Dynamics; Dynamic Stochastic Games of Network Formation; Equilibrium Markov Process of Network Formation; Basins of Attraction; Harris Decomposition; Ergodic Probability Measures; Dynamic Path Dominance Core; Dynamic Pairwise Stability; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C71; C72. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50476 Factors Influencing Salaries of Agricultural Economics Professionals at Land Grant Institutions AgEcon Popp, Jennie S. Hughes; Abdula, Arby; Newton, Doris J.; Pittman, Dianne; Danforth, Diana M.. Research in the mid 1900s suggested that salary gaps existed between men and women in academia. Though the research helped bring attention to salary gaps, less focus was on causes of salary differences. More recent research suggested differences in salaries were based on performance. A survey was sent to agricultural economics professionals at land grant intuitions to identify the factors that influence their salaries. Results of the ordered probit model suggest that seven variables can be used to explain salaries: having attained tenure, working at an 1862 institution, the amount of grant dollars, the number of journal articles, highest academic rank and the percentage of appointment that is in administration (positive influences) and importance of... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Salary and performance; Tracking survey; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A11; A14. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46722 Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism AgEcon Patacchini, Eleonora; Zenou, Yves. This paper studies whether conformism behavior affects individual outcomes in crime. We present a social network model of peer effects with ex-ante heterogeneous agents and show how conformism and deterrence affect criminal activities. We then bring the model to the data by using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. A novel social network-based empirical strategy allows us to identify peer effects for different types of crimes. We find that conformity plays an important role for all crimes, especially for petty crimes. This suggests that, for juvenile crime, an effective policy should not only be measured by the possible crime reduction it implies but also by the group interactions it engenders. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social Networks; Linear-in-means Model; Spatial Autoregressive Model; Social Norms; Labor and Human Capital; A14; C21; D85; K42; Z13. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90945 Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds AgEcon Jackson, Matthew O.; Golub, Benjamin; Jackson, Matthew O.. We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and naively update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors' opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of all agents in large societies converge to the truth, despite their naive updating. We show that this happens if and only if the influence of the most influential agent in the society is vanishing as the society grows. Using simple examples, we identify two main obstructions which can prevent this. By ruling out these obstructions, we provide general structural conditions on the social network that are sufficient for convergence to truth. In addition, we show how social influence changes when some... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social Networks; Learning; Diffusion; Bounded Rationality; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D85; D83; A14; L14; Z13. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9101 Transfer of Institutions: Actors and Constraints - The Russian Case in a Global Context AgEcon Oleinik, Anton. Modernity is usually thought as a complex society with clearly differentiated spheres of everyday life. It means, in particular, that economic rules do not interfere with the norms structuring political, social, scientific and other interactions. The complex, differentiated society sharply contrasts with a "small" and homogeneous "pre-modern" society. The process of modernization, i.e. differentiation of the spheres of everyday life, can take various forms. In an advanced country it relies on internal forces. Modernization in this context looks like an evolutionary, "bottom-up" development. In a backward country (Russia and Germany in the first half of the 20th century), modernization requires a strong governmental (from the top to the bottom)... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: State bureaucracy; Economic backwardness; Catch-up modernization; Conservative modernization; Opportunism; Institutional constraints; Power; Authority; Invidious comparison; Institutional importation; Democracy; Shared mental model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; A14; B15; B25; B52; D73; H83; K42; N40; O17; P21; P37; P51. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26333 Willingness to Pay for Information Programs about E-Commerce: Results from a Convenience Sample of Rural Louisiana Businesses AgEcon Watson, Susan; Nwoha, Ogbonnaya John; Kennedy, Gary A.; Rea, Kenneth. The probability of a business paying various amounts of money for an e-commerce presence ultimately depends on demographic features, experiences with e-commerce from a buyer’s and seller’s perspective, technological expertise, and knowledge of e-commerce opportunities and limitations. Estimating functions to assign probabilities associated with the willingness to pay for an e-commerce presence will assist in forecasting regional likelihood of certain profiles paying various monetary amounts for an e-commerce presence. In addition, if services are provided at no cost by a third party, value to a society will be maximized by selecting profiles with the highest willingness to pay. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: E-commerce; Internet; Rural businesses; Technology; Willingness to pay; A14; C25; D21; O13; O14; O33; Q16. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43502 Registros recuperados: 9 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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